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ROAD TO RECOVERY: PAKISTAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
CRISES IN THE FAT A
Naji'a Tameezt

"For the first five days they beat us
constantly with leather belts across the top and
bottom of our backs throughout the day, up to
an hour at a time. The pain was too much to
describe. There were always five soldiers at
every interrogation session; all in army
uniform but usually only one of them did the
talking. He would threaten to kill me if I didn't
confess to being part of the Taliban. I kept
telling him that neither I, nor my Ayub, ever
belonged to the Taliban, we are just farmers.
On hearing this [he} would scream '[y}our
brother is going to die tonight! If you don't
want to see him for the last time speak the
truth!' " 1
t Naji'a Tameez is a May 2015 graduate of the Syracuse University College of Law.
She would like to thank her family and close friends for always providing the open
discussion of this deeply personal topic, which pushed her to conduct her own research into
the human rights crises in Pakistan's tribal lands.
1. AMNESTY lNT'L, 'THE HANDS OF CRUELTY' ABUSES BY ARMED FORCES AND TALIBAN
IN PAKISTAN'S TRIBAL AREAS 20 (2012), available at http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/
files/public/p4026_end_impunity_in_tribal_areas.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015)
[hereinafter Hands of Cruelty].
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INTRODUCTION
Niaz, a 39-year-old farmer from Swat, and his younger brother
Ayub are among the thousands of men and boys swept up in security
operations by Pakistan's armed forces in areas formerly controlled by
the Taliban. Niaz was released ten days after his arrest, on that same
day he was confronted with Ayub's dead body, the hospital claiming he
had died of "heart stroke" in army custody. This is just one of the
thousands of instances of uninvestigated enforced disappearance, torture
and death inflicted upon the tribal lands of Pakistan.
The tribal lands have been entrenched in a human rights crisis for
decades, but since 2004 conditions in the region have taken a
considerable nosedive. Due to the U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan and
the Taliban2 insurgency in Pakistan's tribal lands, thousands of people
in the tribal lands have been subject to unjust and inhumane treatment, 3
tens of thousands of people have died and millions of people have been
displaced. The Pakistani government has not only made minimal effort
to remedy this crisis and help its citizens, but has also exacerbated the
poor conditions in the tribal lands.
This paper begins by reviewing the structure of government in the
tribal lands and how said structure puts Pakistan in violation of
international human rights law, 4 international humanitarian law 5 and

2. The Taliban presence in Pakistan is a combination of Taliban and al-Qaeda militants
who fled Afghanistan and slipped through Pakistan's borders in 2001 and 2002. They
formed a new insurgency and drew together Pakistani veterans of the Taliban movement
and recruited new members who agreed with their platform against U.S. military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at 29-30. All references to the Taliban in this note are
references to the Pakistani Taliban movement, specifically the TTP.
3. In Prosecutor v. Furundzija the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia emphasized that humane treatment revolved around "the general principle of
respect for human dignity[, which] forms the common foundation of both international
human rights law and international humanitarian law."
"The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as
human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person,
whatever his or her gender.... This principle is intended to shield human beings
from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by
unlawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the honour, the selfrespect or the mental well-being of a person."
Daniel Thurer, Dunant's Pyramid: Thoughts on the "Humanitarian Space", 89 lNT'L REV.
RED CROSS 4 7, 57 (Mar. 2007).
4. International human rights law is comprised of international human rights treaties,
which governments "undertake to put into place domestic measures and legislation
compatible with their treaty obligations and duties." INT'L HUM. RTS. L., available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited
May JO, 2015).
5. International humanitarian law (IHL) is comprised of principles and rules governing
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customary international law. 6 This paper then argues that Pakistan must
remedy these grave circumstances in order to meet its international legal
obligations and abide by its own constitution as it applies to the rest of
the country.
Pakistan must ensure that all of its citizenry, of which the people of
the tribal lands are a part, is treated equally, humanely and in
accordance with international law and custom. This paper then
concludes by offering some of the more important reforms Pakistan
must make to begin complying with international obligations. These
include, but are not limited to, fully incorporating the tribal lands into
the central government, setting up proper mechanisms for
representation, providing adequate education and healthcare, as well as
equal treatment of women.

I.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES STEM FROM POOR
GOVERNING STRUCTURE AND PAKISTAN'S INABILITY
TO BALANCE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INTEREST
Pakistan is made up of five administrative provinces, 7 one of which
is in the northwest part of the country, known as the Federally
Administered Tribal Area ("FAT A"). The FAT A is further divided into
several tribal agencies, from north to south: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber,
Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. 8 Most of
the conduct of all parties to international and non-international armed conflicts. Key
provisions of IHL include the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (which Pakistan signed in
1951) and customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed
conflict. What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (July
2004), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2015).
6. "Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from
established state practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international
treaties."
Customary International Law, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law (last visited May 10, 2015).
7. The four remaining provinces are known as Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Kyber
Pakhtunkhwa. Before the renaming of this province in 2010, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa was
known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The former NWFP is also a tribal
area but it is not the subject of this note. Though there is some spill over from the conflict
in the FATA into Kyber Pakhtunkhwa, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa participates in the central
government and has not been as gravely affected by the US' war in Afghanistan, the Taliban
insurgency or by Pakistan's neglect. Provinces and Administrative Units of Pakistan,
GOVT. PAKISTAN, MINISTRY INFO., BROADCASTING, & NAT'L HERITAGE (2012-13), available
at http://nationalheritage.gov.pk/provinces.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
8. The FATA is further divided into several tribal agencies, from north to south:
Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.
North and South Waziristan are especially troubled within the FATA because they are
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these agencies are astride the Durand Line, the disputed international
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 9
The FATA is a partially autonomous region because, under
Pakistan's constitution, it is governed primarily through tribal
leadership but ultimately supervised directly by the executive branch of
Pakistan's central government. This executive mechanism of governing
the FATA 10 leaves the people living there completely unprotected.
There is a total absence of law in the region since neither legislative nor
judicial control officially extends there. The FAT A is Pakistan's least
integrated and least developed province. 11 The Pakistani state has failed
to invest in either the human development of this area or in the physical
infrastructure that would connect the FAT A to the rest of Pakistan. On
top of that, Pakistanis living in the FAT A have no redress for the gross
human rights violations that are committed at the hands of tribal heads,
the Taliban, the Pakistani military, and the United States through drone
strikes, because there are extensive limitations on the ability of the
central government to act as a check. As a result, most FATA residents
have little sense of patriotism or even responsibility towards the
Pakistani state. 12
The influx of Arab Mujahideen in the 1980s and of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda fighters since 2001 brought "political Islam, money and illicit
economic activity" to the region and "buttressed emergent Islamist
leadership." 13 The region has also undergone changes in the
demographic strength of certain tribes; this, in conjunction with the
infusion of new resources and militant influence, has caused discord in
the traditional tribal hierarchy. 14
This has allowed new charismatic, religious leaders to emerge as

Taliban strongholds, which have led them to become a heavy target of Pakistan's military
campaign and the primary site of continued drone attacks from the United States. Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, KHYBER PAKTUNKHWA FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL
AREAS & BALOCHISTAN MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND, available at http://www.pakistan
mdtf.org/fata.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
9. C. Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and J. Alexander Their, Troubles on the
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Dec. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.usip.org/publications/troubles-the-pakistan-afghanistan-border (last visited May
10, 2015) [hereinafter Fair].
I 0. See infra Part IV.
11. Pakistan's Lawless, Impoverished Northwest, ASIA SENTINEL (Aug. 2013),
available
at
http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/pakistans-lawless-impoverishednorthwest/ (last visited May 10, 2015) [hereinafter Impoverished Northwest].
12. Fair, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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political entrepreneurs using political Islam as their instrument of
mobilization. These Islamist leaders also gained considerable
credibility and resources with the influx of foreign fighters from the
Soviet-jihad period and the persistent flow of financial and Islamist
resources during the period of Taliban consolidation in Afghanistan.
Critically, these new Islamist and militant leaders have robust ties with
Pakistan's chief Islamist parties (such as the Jamiat-e Ulame- Islam
and the Jamaat Islami), with the Taliban and its allied militants, as
well as with al Qaeda. 15

In addition to these new influences, other factors that contribute to
the FAT A's instability are the migration of FAT A residents out of the
FATA and into the more settled areas of Pakistan or abroad. 16 People
who leave generally come from "lower tribal lineages with relatively
low social and tribal prestige" and use the opportunity away from the
FAT A to financially provide for their families. 17 Leaving the FATA
also allows them to understand the inequality in the tribal lands and
bring this awareness back to those who still live there. 18 In addition, the
new influx of money allows the families to seek power and influence in
correspondence with their new wealth, which then begets changes and
conflict in the tribal structure. 19
The FAT A gained particular significance because of its location
along the Afghan border, which resulted in remnants of al-Qaeda and
Taliban militants seeking refuge in the FATA's remote villages and
difficult terrain. 20 Militants then used these remote locations to launch
attacks against international forces in Afghanistan and then also allied
themselves with local insurgents, based primarily in the Waziristan
agencies, which then led to concerns regarding Pakistan's internal
security. Its location makes the FATA key to policing the AfghanPakistan border and also the primary site of U.S. drone attacks. 21 The
opposition from the FATA tribes and their alliances with each other and

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Fair, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In 2012, the U.S. carried out about 48 serial drone strikes on suspected al-Qaeda
and Taliban members. These strikes resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties; lack of
access to these tribal areas has prevented independent verification of statistics. The U.S.
drone strikes cause much controversy, outrage and civilian casualties in Pakistan. See
Pakistan: Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights, HUM. RTS. WATC H (Feb. 1 2013), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/0 I /pakistan-abuses-impunity-erode-rights (last visited
May 10, 2015).
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with militant groups across Pakistan has made the situation especially
volatile in the last decade, both for Pakistan's domestic security and the
war in Afghanistan. 22 The continued drone attacks have also further
soured the relationship between the FAT A and Pakistan's central
government, as there is now a feeling of betrayal and abandonment
where the people of the tribal lands feel their government has allowed a
foreign power to wreak complete havoc and destruction upon them. 23
While these factors all contribute to the derogation of the area and to the
rise of militant violence, the lack of societal development as a result of
Pakistan's longtime neglect is also a significant factor that must be
taken into account. 24
The combination of having to balance domestic interests and the
interests of foreign powers makes the situation more complicated for
Pakistan and limits its military options. As a result, many of the actions
Pakistan has taken in its counter-insurgency effort have been
questionable. Accusations of arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced
disappearances and collective punishment have steadily increased over
the last few years as Pakistan has regained territory from the Taliban
and shifted its focus to smaller clashes with militant groups. This is
especially problematic from a legal standpoint because from 2008 to
2010 Pakistan ratified multiple human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the UN
Convention Against Torture ("UNCAT") and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 25

22. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH - PAKISTAN 144 (2011).
Though the War in Afghanistan has wound down considerably there are still American
troops in Afghanistan, training Afghan security forces, aiding in the reconstruction process
and continuing to manage the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These foreign troops
are directly affected by Pakistan's ability to manage the FATA and Waziristan especially, a
fact Pakistan has to take into account when they take action in the region. Id.
23. Umar Farooq, Civilians Bear Brunt of Pakistan's War in the Northwest, FOREIGN
PoL'Y
(Feb.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2013/02/11 /civilians_bear_brunt_of_pakistans_war_in _the_northwest (last visited
May 10, 2015).
24. Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11.
25. Arshad Mahmood, ICCPR Ratified, DAWN (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.dawn.com/news/875750/iccpr-ratified (last visited May 10, 2015); Chapter IV
Human
Rights,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 31, 2015); Status of Ratification Interactive
Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS, available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited
May 10, 2015) (Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996, the ICESCR in 2008, and the ICCPR
and UNCAT in 2010).
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Though compliance with these agreements is difficult to enforce on
an international level, ratification creates a duty on Pakistan's part to
fulfill the terms of the treaties. 26
With ratification Pakistan
acknowledged that there exists a universal standard for the treatment
and governing of people and that Pakistan has a responsibility to
provide its citizens with that standard of living. Yet Pakistan has not
fulfilled its duty of incorporating these universal standards into its
governmental structure when it comes to the FATA.
Despite this, there are ways that Pakistan can begin to repair the
damage that has been done in the tribal lands and act in accordance with
its own constitution as well as international law. Pakistan can create a
fair and more representative system of governing the region by
integrating the FAT A into the federal union, of which the other
provinces are already a part. Pakistan can invest in the area's
infrastructure, education, healthcare system (what little exists), and
security and hold those who have committed human rights abuses
accountable.

IL

UNDERSTANDING HOW THE HISTORY OF THE FAT A
INFLUENCED THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

The history and makeup 27 of the FAT A explains the logic behind
Pakistan's handling of the region, because the fact that the FAT A
borders Afghanistan makes it a very central and strategic location 28
from which to carry out militant operations. This, in combination with
the rough and varied terrain, makes the FAT A treacherous for those
unfamiliar with the terrain to infiltrate. The people of the FATA, who
number close to 3.9 million by recent estimates, also make effective

26. Enforcement of international agreements is difficult because all nations are
sovereign and there is no overarching legal body that can force states to comply. Often
economic sanctions or military force are threatened or used to create compliance but such
actions are dependent upon what stake enforcing states have in another state's compliance.
Julian Ouellet, Enforcement Mechanisms, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Sept. 2004), available
at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/enforcement-mechanisms (last visited May IO,
2015).
27. The terrain of the tribal lands makes the region a difficult one to tame. It is a
mountainous region but is also made up of forests and deserts. Its extreme winters and
summers make it difficult for armed forces to carry out effective operations. Akbar Ahmed
& Harrison Akins, Waziristan: 'The Most Dangerous Place in the World, ' AL JAZEERA (Apr.
12, 2013, 9:37 PM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/
04/20134983149771365.html (last visited May 10, 2015); HASNAT, supra note 22, at 145 .
28. HASNAT, supra note 22.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/6

8

Tameez: Road to Recovery: Pakistan's Human Rights Crises in the FATA

2015]

Road to Recovery

453

military operations difficult. 29 The FAT A operates under a tribal
system of government where clans are defined by common ancestry;
most FATA residents are Pashtuns. 30 Because most tribes straddle the
Durand Line, cross border movement is "substantial and difficult to
control. " 31
Prior to the Taliban insurgency the tribes dealt with issues of
crime, administration and politics through their own traditions, an
arrangement that was accepted by the British when they were in power
and later by Pakistan's government as well. 32 The Jirgas were by no
means perfect, but they emphasized mediation rather than violence as a
method of conflict resolution. Safdar Dawar, a journalist from North
Waziristan and head of the Tribal Union of Journalists, reminisces that
"the elders and the people recall the situation before 2001, [when] they
had their own culture, unity, lashkars [militias], and peace committees,"
he explains, that the people of the FAT A know that they were more
effective than any tools from "these stakeholders in the Great Game." 33
They kept relative peace among the tribal people they served. 34 But in
recent years, the Taliban gained control and severed the structure of

29. AMNESTY INT'L, AS IF HELL FELL ON ME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES IN
NORTHWEST PAKISTAN 20 (June 2010), available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/
sites/default/files/documents/amnesty_as_if_hell_fell_on_me.pdf (last visited May 10,
2015) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L]. The tribes of the FATA have a history of resistance,
most notably with Soviet occupation forces in 1979 but also much earlier when the British
were colonizing the Indian sub content. The British tried to establish some sort of central
rule in Waziristan by sending governors into the region. These governors acted more like
ambassadors; they had very limited jurisdiction and were barely effective in keeping order
in the region. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27. Tribes like the Mehsuds and Wazirs from
North and South Waziristan regularly repelled the British when the British encroached on
their territory, they would leave the British forces in shambles and refused to make
concessions until the colonial troops had no choice but to retreat. David Ignatius,
Waziristan and the British Experience, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2009), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-10-25/opinions/368562161 south-waziristan-tribalareas-tribal-leaders (last visited May 10, 2015).
30. With a population of at least 50 million, the Pashtun people are Afghanistan's
largest ethnic group, and are also the second-largest ethnicity in Pakistan. Pashtuns are
united by the Pashto language, which is a member of the lndo-Iranian language family,
although many also speak Dari (Persian) or Urdu. Kallie Szczepanski, Who are the
Pashtun, ABOUT Eouc. (2014), available at asianhistory.about.com/od/gloassaryps/g/WhoAre-The-Pashtun.htm (last visited May 10, 2015).
31. Fair, supra note 9.
32. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149.
33. "Stakeholders in the Great Game" is a reference to the key players in the FATA
conflict, the U.S., the Taliban and Pakistan's military forces. Farooq, supra note 23.
34. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27 .

Published by SURFACE, 2015

9

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 6

454

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:2

Jirgas, giving way instead to militant religious leaders, who govern on
the basis of stringent religious doctrine. 35
The Taliban's method of tribal governing is not well taken by the
people of the FAT A. The people of the FAT A have traditionally abided
by an honor code called Pashtunwali that predates Islam. 36 This ethical
code, in combination with tradition and religion is what the region's
culture is comprised of; however, the religious extremism that
contributed to the region's instability can largely be attributed to the
relatively recent alterations to the region's power structures. 37
When Pakistan gained independence from India in 194 7,
Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah "maintained the British civil
structure of the tribal agency and the role of the political agent 38 in
administering the Tribal Areas. " 39 Jinnah continued to operate the tribal
lands in much the same way as the British had. However, his leadership
differed markedly in policy when, in April 1948, Jinnah made the
unprecedented move of withdrawing military forces from the province
of Waziristan upon meeting with a grand Jirga of FATA tribesman. 40
He said,
Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations we
ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a
concrete and definite gesture on our part... Pakistan has no desire to
unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the contrary; Pakistan
wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, selfreliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and
economic uplift. .. We want to put you on your legs as self-respecting
citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing
what is best in you and your land. 41

As Jinnah is widely considered a brilliant political mind, his speech
to the grand Jirga can be interpreted as strategic political rhetoric meant
to placate the tribes. However, it was also a practical assessment of the
situation and the needs of the region. Jinnah knew that the northwest
frontier of the newly created Pakistan would be difficult to incorporate;
its people had a long history of tribal leadership that would not be easy

35 .
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

HASNAT, supra 22, at 149.
Id.
Fair, supra note 9.
See infra Part IV.
Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27.
Id.
HASNAT, supra note 22, at 148.
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to transition into the central government. 42 It is obvious from Jinnah's
speech that while Pakistan was willing to aid the FAT A it never
intended to fully integrate the FAT A, which is what created the rift that
exists today.
Instead of fighting them into submission with resources and time
the new government did not have, Jinnah made sure they were aware of
their internal autonomy, while still being subject to the central
government. Though keeping the tribal lands autonomous was a
practical necessity at the time it was ultimately detrimental. Because
despite their autonomy, the tribal lands are subject to Pakistan's central
government, yet are inadequately represented in the central government.
Jinnah had promised the tribesmen economic and social aid to lift their
society,
Pakistan will not hesitate to go out of its way to give every possible
help- financial and otherwise-to build up the economic and social life
of our tribal brethren across the border. . . It will certainly be my
constant solicitude and indeed that of my Government to try to help
you to educate your children and with your co-operation and help we
may very soon succeed in making a great progress in this direction. 43

For the next fifty years or so Pakistan struck a balance between the
tribal structure in the FATA and Pakistan's central government with
mechanisms in place to ensure law and order.44 This balance, which
was just non-interference from the central government, did little to
actually lift Waziristan or any of the FATA out of its impoverished
conditions, in fact the non-interference, and therefore isolation, only
pushed the FATA further into the Taliban's hands. 45
For example, in 1996, the government extended voting rights for
adults to the FAT A. 46 But, "mainstream parties were not allowed to
mobilize in FATA as the elections were supposedly held on a non-party
basis."47 The problem though is that Islamist parties held great
influence over mosques and schools, and therefore their candidates

42. Pakistan had just seceded from India and creating a new country was challenging
enough without taking on the arduous task of integrating an autonomous tribal region that
was used to battling those who attempted to conquer it.
43. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 148.
44. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27.
45. "According to a WHO report, nearly 50 percent of tribesmen live in abject poverty,
75 percent have no access to clean drinking water. Annual population growth rate is almost
4 percent as compared to nationally cited figures of 2 percent." Impoverished Northwest,
supra note 1 1.
46. Fair, supra note 9.
47. Id.
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could effectively lobby for votes. 48 As a result, the tribal lands elected
mullahs to represent them in the National Assembly in 1997 and again
in 2002. 49 This is a major departure from tradition. Previously, maliks
chose their tribal representatives to Parliament on a "secular and tribal
basis." 50 The collapse of the maliki system because of Pakistan's
neglect and the Taliban's influence, is significant to the FATA because
it created a power vacuum that mullahs and Islamic militants then
eagerly filled.
Pakistan continued to treat the tribal lands as separate and apart but
never gave them true autonomy as far as governing. Jinnah's political
promises remained just that; the central government continued to
neglect the people of the FAT A. 51 The people of the tribal lands have
always lived in destitute conditions. For shelter, most people live in
pueblo-like constructions, 52 usually with no electricity. The area
remains impoverished, with extremely low rates of literacy and little to
no healthcare services. Much of the FAT A is completely inaccessible
because of the lack of infrastructure, including lack of roads and
railways. 53 This lack of attention to a major segment of its population is
a large part of Pakistan's problem in the FATA.
While the central government has neglected to govern the area and
has floundered to regain control in the last decade, the Taliban "seem to
operate with a clear chain of command and high level of discipline, and
ha[ ve] demonstrated strong-and growing-operational and strategic
cohesion." 54 Residents of the FATA who joined the Taliban have done
so for a host of reasons, most of which are ultimately traceable to
unemployment and poverty. 55 Further proving that the rise of Taliban
influence and religious extremism in the FATA is directly traceable to
the lack of social development and infrastructure, a responsibility the

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Fair, supra note 9.
52. Pueblos were housing constructions built from stone, mud and other local material
that were built by Native Americans in the Southwestern United States.
53 . HASNAT, supra note 22, at 147.
54. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 30.
55 . Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding FATA : 2011 Attitudes Towards
Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan 's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Vol. V
2012),
COMM.
APPRAISAL
&
MOTIVATION
PROG .,
available
at
http://www.understandingfata.org/uf-volume-v/Understanding_F AT A_ Vol-V-11.pdf (last
visited May 10, 2015).
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central government should be handling. 56 In fact, while more that 30%
of the FATA characterizes the Taliban as "terrorists," almost 23%
recognize them to also be uneducated youth. 57 The lack of literacy and
jobs make supporting the Taliban fruitful for those who join their ranks
and those who do not join are too intimidated to resist in any
meaningful way. 58

III. GOVERNING THE FAT A: CONTRADICTING THE
CONSTITUTION
The Pakistani Constitution of 1973 ("the Constitution") gives
special status to the tribal areas and directs that neither the power of
Parliament nor of the power of the judicial system shall extend to the
tribal areas without the President's assent. 59 While the rest of Pakistan
functions as a parliamentary democratic republic, the FAT A does not.
Under Article 51 of the Constitution, the FATA is included among the
territories of Pakistan. 60 The FAT A functions as a combination of
exclusive executive authority and tribal tradition. 61 The extent of the
FATA's involvement in the central government is that FATA
representatives can be elected on a non-party basis to the National
Assembly and the Senate, but it still remains under the direct executive
control of the President. 62 Despite election to the National Assembly
and Senate, representatives cannot exercise any legislative powers with
regard to the FATA, meaning that any laws passed by the National
Assembly do not apply to the FAT A unless ordered by the President. 63
56. Id.
57. Id. at 95.
58. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 147.
59. History of FATA, FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS, available at
http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iid=28&fid=2&pid=23&mid=l3 (last visited May 10, 2015)
("Soon after [Pakistan's] Independence [from India], the various tribes in the region entered
into an agreement with the Government of Pakistan, pledging allegiance to the newly
created state. The agreement ... did not include political autonomy of the tribes. The
instruments of agreement, signed in 1948, granted the tribal areas a special administrative
status. Except where strategic considerations dictated, the tribal areas were allowed to
retain their semi-autonomous status, exercising administrative authority based on tribal
codes and traditional institutions. This unique system was crystallized in Pakistan's
Constitution of 1973 .").
60. PAKISTAN CONST. art.
51; see also Administrative System, FEDERALLY
ADMfNISTERED
TRIBAL
AREAS,
available
at
http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iid
=29&fid=2&pid=23&mid= 13 (last visited May I 0, 2015).
61. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149; PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 51, 59, 246-47.
62. Administrative System, supra note 60; PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 51, 59, 246-47
63. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 27; Administrative System, supra note 60.
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The special mechanism for governing this region falls under a
body of law called the Frontier Crime Regulations ("FCR"). 64 The FCR
dates back to the 1870s when Pakistan was still part of India and the
Despite India's
whole subcontinent was under British rule. 65
independence from Britain, then Pakistan's secession from India, and
multiple revised constitutions, the FCR has been retained. 66 Through
reliance on the concept of Collective Punishment, the FCR codifies the
government's ability to commit human rights violations and fails to
recognize "the rule of law, due process, political representation or
democratic institutions."67 Under the FCR, "the government may hold
an entire tribe or subgroup accountable for the actions of alleged
wrongdoers. " 68 This kind of legal framework and the associated
mechanisms for law enforcement are specific to the FAT A. Segments
of FATA tribes, Pakistani human rights organizations and even
Pakistan's Supreme Court have decried the FCR; the court going so far
as to deem the FCR unconstitutional. 69
Though Pakistan's central government has often promised to
reform the FCR and improve the status of those living in the tribal
lands, it has not made any substantial changes to the FCR in 113
years. 70 The millions who live in the FATA still have "second-class
legal status."71 Pakistan's constitution lays out a list of guaranteed
fundamental rights for all citizens, but it then excludes the FATA from
benefiting from said rights and excludes the majority of judicial, legal
and parliamentary control from reaching there. 72
Since the control of parliament and the judiciary do not extend to
the FATA, it is essentially under direct executive control. The President

64. It is worth noting that under art. 247(6) of the 1973 constitution, the president of
Pakistan has the constitutional authority to end the applicability of the FCR to any agency
after consulting with a tribal Jirga. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26-27; PAKJSTAN
CONST. art. 247, § 6.
65. History of FATA, supra note 59.
66. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 247.
67. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26; Umar Farooq, Pakistan's FATA: Lawless no
more?, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 22, 2014, 12:10 AM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2014/03/pakistan-fata-lawless-no-more-20 l 4321111550828897 .html (last
visited May 10, 2015).
68. Fair, supra note 9.
69. Id.
70. Id.; Umar Farooq, Pakistan's FATA: Lawless no more? ALJAZEERA (Mar. 22,
2014, 12: IO PM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/pakistanfata-lawless-no-more-20 l 4321111550828897 .html (last visited May 10, 2015).
71. Fair, supra note 9; Farooq, supra note 70.
72. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 8(3).
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appoints a Political Agent 73 ("PA") for each agency within the FATA
who exercises a broad range of administrative, executive and judicial
powers. 74 The PA wields so much power that he can "order whole
villages to be burnt down and tribes to be blockaded or sent into
exile. " 75 The only check on the PA is that he may consult with the
Jirgas 76 when resolving disputes.77 However this is a discretionary
option left up to the PA. 78 Currently, the FATA is administered by the
Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ("KP") "in his capacity as an
agent to the President of Pakistan, under the overall supervision of the
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions in Islamabad. " 79

IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTANI
ARMED FORCES
The current conflict between Pakistan's armed forces and the
insurgents in the FAT A is widely considered Pakistan's largest security
threat. Though the social tensions that underlie this conflict are hardly
new, the war itself began after the U.S. and its coalition invaded
Afghanistan in 2001. 80 The fall of Afghanistan's Taliban regime caused
many Taliban officers and leaders to cross the border into the FAT A. 81
As a strategic safe haven, Waziristan was ideal for escaped Taliban
73. The Political Agent position was created by the British around 1901. "Each
agency was administered by a Political Agent who was vested with wide powers and
provided funds to secure the loyalties of influential elements in the area." History of FATA ,
supra note 59.
74. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26.
75. Farooq, supra note 70; see Fair, supra note 9 ("The role of the Political Agency
has continued to erode both due to the diminished quality and rank of the civil servants
assigned to the position and due to the ever-expanding corruption within the agency since
1947. In recent years, the army has further supplanted the PA' s authority in key agencies
such as North and South Waziristan.").
76. Jirgas are traditionally made up of 3 elder tribesmen, known as Maliks , who are
appointed and dismissed at the whim of the PA. Though they are meant to function as a
check on the Political Agent's extensive authority, practically speaking, they serve at the
pleasure of the executive appointed PA. Around the same tie as when the role of the
Political Agent was carved out, the Maliki system was developed as well. The Maliki
system allowed the "colonial administration to exercise control over the tribes. Under this
system, local chiefs (Maliks) were designated as intermediaries between the members of
individual tribes and the colonial authorities, and also assisted in the implementation of
government policies." History of FATA, supra note 59.
77. Farooq, supra note 70.
78. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149.
79. Administrative System, supra note 60.
80. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143.
81. AMN ESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20.
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members to carry out attacks on the U.S-led coalition. 82 From there,
they could assist whatever remained of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan, who had by then escaped into the villages and mountains
to avoid further attack. 83 The northern agencies in the FAT A began
noticing a significant increase in Taliban presence in 2006. By 2009 a
substantial portion of the Federally Administered Tribal Area was under
Taliban control. 84
Due to this increase in Taliban presence the U.S. government put
pressure on Pakistan, particularly on then-president General Pervez
Musharraf, to contain the militant forces that had escaped into the
FAT A's mountain terrain and then into the rest of the FAT A. 85
Musharraf was pressured into launching his own military operation to
assist the U.S. and its allies. This was a difficult decision for Pakistan
because its military had developed a close working relationship with the
Launching a military operation, at the
tribesmen since 1979. 86
insistence of the U.S., against those same tribes was not an easy
proposition for Pakistan's military to carry out. The fact that the FATA
tribesmen, especially those already sympathetic to the Taliban,
considered the struggle between the U.S and the Taliban as a justified
"war of liberation" from the U.S.' "War on Islam" made Pakistan's
decision even more difficult. 87
Musharraf succumbed to U.S. pressure and beginning in 2002
Pakistan carried out unenthusiastic military operations, relying on paramilitary forces. In 2008 and 2009 Taliban forces blocked supply routes
through the Khyber agency, which the U.S. and NATO forces used, and
proceeded to seize, loot and burn several hundred supply trucks. Due to
U.S. pressure, Pakistan "conducted fierce battles to maintain this supply
line" in June 2008, January 2009 and March 2010. 88 Operations like
these were often botched and then followed with urgent peace

82. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143.
83. Id.
84. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20.
85. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143.
86. Waziristan has been kept mostly autonomous because of their tradition of
militaristic service and support in the defense of Pakistan. Since 1979, Pakistan's military
established a close relationship with the tribesmen of the FAT A to encourage them to help
the Afghans in their struggle against Soviet occupation. Waziristan was central to the
support of the Mujahideen forces attempting to repel the Soviets. HASNAT, supra note 22, at
143, 145, 147.
87. Id. at 143.
88. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20.
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agreements with the tribes that later fell apart. 89 It was obvious from
Pakistan's halfhearted efforts that they had no desire to establish state
rule in the FAT A by inserting the central government into the largely
autonomous region, at least not through military means.
The drawback to this lack luster effort was that it gave legitimacy
to the Taliban in the FAT A, allowing them to eventually establish their
own party, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (The Pakistani Taliban
Movement, also referred to as the "TTP"). Through Pakistan's every
botched military operation and failed peace agreement, the TTP was
able to gain sympathy and support from the tribesmen, which led to new
resources and recruits, eventually creating a serious obstacle for the
military. 90 The Taliban was no longer just a formidable militant force
but now also an emboldened and legitimized political influence.
Through a series of peace agreements, Pakistan released Prisoners
of War, weapons and territory back to TTP militants, actions that both
the TTP and the tribes in the FATA saw as a weakness. 91 Encouraged
by this display of vulnerability the TTP took steps to challenge state
rule throughout the FATA by carrying out terrorist activity across the
country against law enforcement, military facilities and civilian targets 92
and by appointing their own members to positions of political influence.
This is where the decline of the maliki system is especially
problematic. The decline of the tribal governing structure impaired the
authenticity and legitimacy of the maliks ' leadership.93 Political Agents
favored maliks whose cooperation they could bribe, creating an
environment of corruption and mistrust. As a result, the tribes no longer
recognize or trust maliks as their legitimate representation. 94 They
instead turned to other political forces, more specifically the
"charismatic, religious and militant" alternatives offered by the
Taliban. 95 "These new leaders have effectively captured the various
forms of simmering discontent within the tribes and have emerged as
more legitimate defenders of tribal interests. Thus, the mullahs have
now become respected representatives of the tribes, as have key Islamist
militants in FAT A. " 96

89.

HASNAT,

supra note 22, at 144.

90. Id.
91. Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Fair, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The increased influence of the TTP had widespread ramifications
across Pakistan. Constantly on the defensive in order to preserve the
interests of the U.S. rather than the interests of Pakistani citizens,
Pakistan ended up prolonging the conflict. Its indecisive military
strategy damaged the military's prestige, caused much human casualty,
property damage and displaced thousands of people, all while causing
massive strain on Pakistan's economy. 97 Residents of the FATA were
affected much worse, dying by hundreds due to random and violent
terrorist attacks, U.S. drone strikes and indiscriminate action by
Pakistan's military. 98
The U.S. drone attacks and the subsequent bombings by Pakistani
warplanes further soured the FAT A's relationship and opinion of the
central government, causing them to seek refuge in the only viable
opposition, the TTP. 99 Anti-U.S. sentiment is still strong in the FATA,
with 79.3% of tribal people opposing American military presence in the
area, a number heavily influenced by the continuing drone strikes. 100
There is also bitterness towards the Taliban for having destroyed the
peace of the region and bringing upon the FATA the chaos caused by
continued drone strikes and Pakistan's military. 101
Nearly 70% of the FATA opposes the presence of Pakistani
Taliban fighters 102 because in addition to suicide bombings across
Pakistan, the TTP has also become an oppressive presence in the FATA
by constantly eliminating its opponents, fighting the Pakistani state and
its security forces, and carrying out beheadings and kidnapping people
for ransom. By 2009, the TTP had carried out so many violent and
disruptive operations, both outside and within the FAT A, especially
against military sites that it forced the military' s hand to end the conflict

97. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 144.
98. Id.
99. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, Waziristan - the Mother of all Battles, NEWS (Oct. 20,
2009), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=20403 7&Cat
=9&dt=9/2/2009 (last visited May 10, 2015).
100. Shinwari, supra note 55, at 87.
101. Tribesmen have often banded together to expel al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other
extremist groups from their land. But they have also consistently claimed that the source of
their current problems lies in Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of 2001. "If you are asking
about Americans," Dawar says, "100% [of the people] here are hating Americans. They are
thinking that this whole drama is from the side of America, because they came to
Afghanistan. That is why they are demanding America leave Afghanistan." Farooq, supra
note 23.
102. Shinwari, supra note 55, at 87.
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as swiftly as possible, leading to more violence and death in the
FATA. 103
In 2009, Pakistan renewed air and ground offensives against the
TTP in the FAT A. These attacks were intended to target militant
strongholds but were often inaccurate since Pakistan was working with
very limited and often unreliable intelligence, a result of having little to
no public support or assets in the area. 104 From the beginning of the war
in Afghanistan, public opinion in the FATA favored the Taliban and
their efforts to rid the region of the infiltration of a foreign power.
However, the TTP's violent and destructive tactics have caused them to
lose much of the public sympathy they gained when Pakistan first began
military operations.
This does not imply that public opinion has shifted in Pakistan's
favor.
Pakistan's most recent military campaign in the FATA,
Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an air and ground offensive launched on June
15, 2014 in North Waziristan, has caused mass civilian casualty and is
yet another source of major human rights violations exacted by Pakistan
against FATA residents. 105 Zarb-e-Azb was launched after government
peace talks with Taliban leaders once again fell through, and though the
military had been planning the offensive well before, the Operation was
pursued ultimately because of the major Taliban attack on Pakistan's
largest airport on June 9, 2014. 106
Zarb-e-Azb was aimed to be a "comprehensive operation against
foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North
Waziristan" but practically resulted in the displacement of 500,000 of

103. See Yusufzai, supra note 99.
104. See id.
105. Rebecca Santana & Asif Shahzad, Pakistan Launches Offensive Against Military
Near Afghan Border, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2014, 10:23 AM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/15/pakistan-anny-says-launch_ n_5496487 .html
(last visited May l 0, 2015).
106. On June 9, 2014, the TTP claimed responsibility for an attack on Pakistan's
Jinnah International Airport, located in Karachi. The nearly 12-hour siege left 28 dead,
including l O TTP attackers. The TTP released a statement following the attack stating, "the
biggest reason for attacking Karachi airport is because it serves as the biggest air logistics
center supplying goods for the Crusaders' war in Afghanistan and Pakistan." This statement
referred to the Afghanistan-bound U.S.-NATO cargo, which comes in through Karachi. The
siege has also been attributed as the TTP's revenge for the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, a
prominent Taliban leader who was killed by U.S. drone strike in November 2013. Declan
Walsh, Pakistani Forces Begin Assault on Militant Strongholds, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2014)
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01 /world/asia/pakistan-anny-begins-groundassault-on-militants.html?_r=2 (last visited May 10, 2015); TTP claims attack on Karachi
airport, DAWN (Jun. 9, 2014) available at http://www.dawn.com/news/l l l 1397/ttp-claimsattack-on-karachi-airport (last visited May 10, 2015).
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people and hundreds of casualties. 107 Zarb-e-Azb has caused Pakistan's
"biggest conflict-driven humanitarian crises since 2009." 108 The
Pakistani military has claimed that no civilian casualties resulted from
Zarb-e-Azb, this claim is unrealistic on its face and has been disproven
through by refugees from the area who have given accounts of the
military' s indiscriminate attacks which have resulted in mass civilian
death and grave injuries. 109 While Pakistan may claim that Operation
Zarb-e-Azb has been successful in ridding the area of militants and
dismantling the TTP's power in the FATA, especially in North
Waziristan, the TTP has made it clear that these claims are inaccurate.
On December 16, 2014, in what can only be described as
retaliation for Zarb-e-Azb, seven TTP militants laid siege on a school in
Peshawar for hours ("Peshawar Attaack"). 110 The school, Army Public
School and Degree College, is primarily for the children of active
military members. 111 By the time the siege ended later that day, there
were at least 100 injuries and 152 casualties; 132 children, 10 school
staff members, three soldiers and the seven militants. 112 The attack is
considered the deadliest attack in Pakistan since October 2007. 113
Pakistan, in a very opportunistic fashion, has used the Peshawar
Attack to institute fast track avenues around the criminal justice system.
On December 17, 2014, the day after the Peshawar Attack, the Prime
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, lifted a moratorium on the death penalty, which
has been in place since 2008, and promised that death warrants would
follow in the coming days. 114 Given that the rise of Taliban control in
the FATA and the main source of criticism against the Pakistani
government in the FAT A is based on the lack of fair governing - the
renewal of the death penalty is particularly problematic.

107. Syed Azeem & Noaman G. Ali , Zarb-e-Azb and the Left: On Imperialism's
Materiality, TANQEED (Aug. 2014) available at http://www.tanqeed.org/2014/08/zarb-e-azband-the-left-on-imperialisms-materiality/ (last visited May 10, 2015); Santana & Shahzad,
supra note 105.
108. Walsh, supra note 106.
109. Id.; Santana & Shahzad, supra note 105 .
110. Sophia Saifi & Greg Botelho, In Pakistan School Attack, Taliban Terrorists Kill
I45, Mostly Children , CNN (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2014/12/16/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-school-attack/ (last visited May 10, 2015).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Sheree Sardar & Katharine Houreld, Pakistan PM Lifts Moratorium on Death
Penalty After School Attack, R EUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://in.reuters.com/
article/2014/12/17/pakistan-school-deathpenaltyidINKBNOJVOLJ20141217 (last visited
May 10, 2015).
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Currently, more than 8,000 prisoners sit on Pakistan's death row,
and about 10% of them are convicted of "terrorism" related offenses. 115
Pakistan's definition of terrorism is very broad, to the point where
almost any crime can fall under the category of "terrorism," as a result
more that 17,000 cases of terrorism are pending in special courts. 116
Those convicted of terrorism are often denied their basic rights; they are
tortured into confessions, denied lawyers, and denied adequate living
conditions. 117 Many defendants who have been convicted of terrorism
were charged on the basis of crimes that bore no relation to terrorism in
the first place; they were sentenced to death despite incredibly unfair
trials. 118
What makes this situation even worse, especially for those in the
FATA who suffer most from these government injustices, is that this
heavy crackdown on "terrorism" has not stopped militant attacks. 119
These crackdowns, which essentially pervert the criminal justice
system, have done nothing to alleviate the actual problem of Taliban
militancy. Instead, they are just another way in which Pakistan's central
government commits human rights violation through the justification of
maintaining security in the FAT A and in Pakistan as a whole.

115. Id.
116. Id. Under Section 6 of the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act (AT A), "Terrorism" is
defined as "the use or threat of action" where among other things, "the use or threat is
designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government or the public or a section of
the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or the use
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause." The
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997, FED. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, GOVT. OF PAK.JSTAN,
available at http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm (last visited May IO, 2015). In 2013, the ATA
was amended so as to expand Section 6 - adding in that "intimidating and terrorizing the
public, social sectors, media persons, business community or attacking the civilians,
including damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson or by any other means,
government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies" would also
be considered "terrorism." Amendment of Section 6, Act XXVII of 1997, GAZETTE OF
PAK.JSTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Mar. 26, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.na.gov.pk/
uploads/documents/1365050846_309.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015). This means that
almost any criminal action can be categorized as terrorism. Such language lends itself to
abuse, hence the large amount of terrorism related cases pending in Pakistani courts and the
hundreds of people sitting on death row.
117. Sardar & Houreld, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES AND CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT COMMIT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF
MAINTAINING SECURITY

The human rights crisis in the FATA can be attributed to three
main sources, the neglect and mistreatment from the Pakistani
government and military, Taliban militancy and influence and the U.S.'
drone attacks. Actors are largely able to continue committing human
rights violations because the very setup of the FAT A leaves the area
susceptible to corruption and abuse. Although the FAT A accounts for
7% of the national population, it receives a mere 1% of the national
budget. 120 The estimated unemployment rate reliably rests somewhere
between 60% and 80% but it often reaches higher numbers depending
on patterns of migrant labor. 121 In regards to healthcare, the ratio of
doctors to people in the FATA is about 1 to 7670, whereas the national
average is about 1 to 1226. 122 There is about one hospital for every fifty
square kilometers, which serve large populations, sometimes extending
to those living Afghanistan's side of the border. 123 The FCR is
responsible for this neglect because the various branches of government
are barely accountable to the FATA.
Relying on the FCR to govern the FAT A violates Pakistan's
human rights obligations under the international human rights
conventions. 124 The extension of the FCR's power is in direct conflict
with the Constitution and the rights it guarantees to the rest of
Pakistan's provinces.
The FCR denies FATA's residents equal
protection under the law, as well as voting rights. 125 Pakistan's central
government and military forces often exploit the FCR to justify human
rights violations, such as collective punishment and unwarranted
detention of tribal leaders' relatives, in an effort to pressure those
leaders for State purposes.
Since the jurisdiction of Pakistan's judiciary does not extend to the
FATA, the FCR has its own judicial mechanism, which consequently
has negative human rights implications. Under the FCR, a Jirga

120. See Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See infra discussion Section VI, Pakistan is Obligated to Act in Compliance with
the International Human Rights Obligations it is a Party to.
125. See PAKJSTAN CONST., arts. 8-28.
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decides all civil and criminal matters arising in the FATA. 126 Should a
FAT A resident wish to appeal a Jirga 's decision they may do so to the
Supreme Court of Pakistan (Pakistan's highest court) or to the Peshawar
High Court through a constitutional writ challenging the decision. 127
The FATA is divided into two administrative categories, protected
areas, which are under the direct control of the government and nonprotected areas, which are administered (indirectly) through local
tribes. 128
In protected areas, criminal and civil cases are decided by political
officers vested with judicial powers. After completing the necessary
inquiries and investigations, a Jirga is constituted with the consent of
the disputing parties. The case is then referred to the Jirga who issues
a verdict, which is examined by the Political Agent. This decision can
be appealed against to the High Court and Supreme Court. Once
appeals are exhausted, execution of the verdict is the responsibility of
the political administration. In non-protected areas, cases are resolved
through a local Jirga at the agency level. Local mediators first
intervene to achieve a truce (tiga) between parties in a criminal case,
or to obtain security (muchalga) in cash or kind for civil disputes.
Thereafter, parties must arrive at a consensus concerning the mode of
settlement (arbitration), riwaj (customary law) or Shariah (Islamic
law). Once the mode of settlement is agreed upon, mediators arrange
for the selection of a Jirga, with the consent of the parties to the
case. 129
Under customary international human rights law, international
humanitarian law and Pakistan's own Constitution, the right to a fair
trial and an impartial court is necessary, but Pakistan has not extended
that principle to the FATA. 130 As it stands, the PA, or a Jirga appointed
by the PA, carries out judicial functions. However, neither can be
considered impartial judicial bodies, and under the FCR their decisions
may not always be appealable to Pakistan's higher courts.
This has always been problematic but is more so now because
under the FCR the power of the PA is so extensive that on "vaguely
defined grounds he can order that individuals or entire communities be
detained without trial for years at a time seize their property and impose
fines, all without any requirement of ordinary criminal trial." 131 This
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Administrative System, supra note 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AMNESTY lNT'L, supra note 29, at 27; PAKISTAN CONST. art. 10.
AMNESTY INT' L, supra note 29, at 27.
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provision has often been used to justify collective punishment during
recent military operations in the FAT A. One of the more notable
instances was during the large-scale military operations in Waziristan in
October 2009.
The military blocked tribal access to necessary
humanitarian aid when they suspected members of the Mehsud tribe to
be involved in Taliban activities, punishing an entire population of
people for the suspected actions of a few.
In recent years, with the increased presence of the Taliban,
Pakistan's military operations in the region, and the U.S. drone attacks,
the tribal mechanism of policing and redress fell subject to the Taliban.
The Taliban openly killed Maliks and entire Jirgas for their alleged
cooperation with Pakistan's central government and military. They then
replaced this already corrupt system with insurgents or Mullahs who are
more sympathetic to the Taliban. 132
Before the Taliban insurgency, tribes in the FAT A had largely
policed themselves through their own traditions, mainly the Jirgas.
This method of enforcement was unfair to begin with because the Jirgas
and Maliks were appointed on the basis of how useful they could be to
the PA. 133 As structured under the FCR, the Jirgas also discriminated
against women by denying women access to tribal councils, even when
many of the decisions directly impacted them. This is just another way
the FCR contradicts the broader constitution, which guarantees, "all
citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law"
and that "there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone." 134
In the last few years, Pakistan has managed to regain control over
most of the FAT A from the Taliban. But in order to accomplish this
goal the military has detained thousands of suspected Taliban supporters
without giving any cause for such action. 135 In an effort to combat
Taliban insurgents Pakistan passed legislation to give the military a
wider breadth of discretion. The Actions in Aid of Civil Power
Regulations (AACPR) was passed in 2011. 136 While the FCR allows
expansion of executive power into the FATA and limits the reach of
parliament and the judiciary, the purpose of the AACPR is to enable the
military to operate against the Taliban and other "armed groups" in the

132. Id. at 28-29.
133. Id. at 28.
134. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 25, §§ 1, 2.
135. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 12.
136. Report Exposes 'the Hands of Cruelty ' in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, AMN ESTY
INT ' L (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/report-exposes-handscruelty-pakistan-s-tribal-areas-2012-12-12 (last visited May 10, 2015).
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Tribal areas "in accordance with the law." 137 The AACPR also gives
the armed forces the flexibility to take on "law and order duties" and
"law enforcement operations." 138
In combination with the FCR, the AACPR gives the military
enough legal coverage to arrest and detain suspects without
justification. What is more troubling is that the military's arrest and
detention practices go way beyond the enhanced powers granted to
them under the AACPR, human rights violations committed by the
military extend as far as enforced disappearances, torture and other ill
treatment of prisoners, which sometimes lead to death. 139 Amnesty
International reports that on a weekly basis "[ m Jen and boys allegedly
arrested and detained by the Armed Forces are being returned dead to
their families or reportedly found dumped across the Tribal Areas." 140
Though the families of the detained and the dead often seek
redress, they are given no explanations for why their loved ones were
taken or what happened to them in the months and years they were
gone. The military conducts no investigations into why the detainees
were arrested in the first place, what happened to them while they were
in prison or what led to their deaths. 141 Regional high courts have called
for local authorities to look into the dumped bodies and a host of other
illegal activities, but investigations are rarely carried out and the
military has not been called upon to give any sort of accounting. 142 This
type of treatment and lack of accountability further degrades the image
and reputation of the government and the military in the eyes of those
living in the FATA. The only way for Pakistan to rectify these
extensive human rights violations and its reputation is to make
significant policy reforms and effective mechanisms of redress.
One would think that the government and military are not held
accountable because their violations are hard to prove or because
records do not exist. However, there are reports that document the
military' s activities regarding forced detention, disappearances and
torture as a method of combating the Taliban in the FATA. The
military has admitted to some of these reports, acknowledging the
detention of some 700 militants held without charges or possibility of

137. Hands of Cruelty, supra note l, at 8-9.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id.
141. /d.atl7
142. Hands of Cruelty, supra note l, at 17.
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trial. 143 Upon inquiry, Pakistan's Attorney General, Irfan Qadir, told the
Supreme Court, "There is a military operation in Waziristan. Under the
law we cannot try these 700 people, nor can we release them, unless the
operation is over." 144
A case that has become famous throughout Pakistan is the case of
the Adiala 11. Eleven prisoners were arrested from different places
because they were believed to be connected to terrorist activity, 145 but in
April 2010, they were all acquitted of the charges by an anti-terrorism
court. 146 Despite their acquittal the eleven prisoners remained in a
detention facility for about a month. Finally, in May 2010, a regional
high court called for the release of the prisoners, declaring their
detention illegal, but shortly after that the eleven had disappeared from
the prison. 147 Pakistan's intelligence agencies continued to give
contradictory statements for sometime before finally admitting to
having them in custody, by which time four had died. 148
VI. PAKISTAN IS OBLIGATED TO ACT IN COMPLIANCE WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
IT IS A PARTY TO
Obligations to citizens within a country's borders do not arise from
just domestic legislation. Countries are bound by an international legal
system as well.
International human rights law, international
humanitarian law and customary international law all play a role in
making sure that all people are given equal opportunities and are treated

143. Pakistan Admits to Holding 700 Militants Without Charge, REUTERS (Jan. 24,
2013, 7:02 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01 /24/us-pakistandetainees-idUSBRE90NOHD20130124 (last visited May 10, 2015).
144. Id.
145. Waseem Ahmad Shah, Case of 'Missing' Adiala Prisoners Far From Over,
DAWN (Aug. 13, 1012, 2:45 AM), available at http://dawn.com/news/741861/case-ofmissing-adiala-prisoners-far-from-over (last visited May 10, 2015). "The prisoners are
wanted by intelligence agencies in connection with different acts of terrorism, including an
attack on the GHQ, a rocket attack on the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra, bomb
blasts at the Rawalpindi Parade Lane mosque, shots fired from anti-aircraft guns on a plane
carrying former President Pervez Musharraf, suicide attacks on a bus of an intelligence
agency in Rawalpindi and other attacks on different military installations and killing of a
number of senior army personnel." Bring 'Missing' Detainees to Court, Agencies Ordered,
DAWN (Feb. 11, 2012, 5:35 AM), available at http://dawn.com/news/694709/bring-missingdetainees-to-court-agencies-ordered (last visited May 10, 2015).
146. Shah, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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humanely. The human rights obligations most relevant to the conflict in
the FAT A (which are covered by an array of international laws) are the
rights to life, fair trial, water, food, housing, education and the highest
attainable standards of healthcare.
There are also significant
prohibitions on torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and
discrimination against women. Pakistan is a party to many international
agreements that cover this broad range of human rights issues and
ratifying 149 or acceding 150 these agreements were notable steps towards
human rights and an acknowledgment of responsibility towards its
citizenry of a certain standard of living and treatment. Though, it is
certainly not enough unless Pakistan takes serious steps towards
compliance with these agreements through governmental reform.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the UN Human
Rights Committee have confirmed that international human rights law
applies both in peacetime and during times of armed conflict. 151 While
some of these rights can be modified or limited during times of armed
conflict, this can only be done as absolutely necessary depending upon
the circumstances of the situation. 152 Therefore the current conflict in
the FAT A does not give the Pakistani government or military legal
justification under international law for the abuses it carries out.

A. International Obligation to Children
In 1990 Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"). 153 The CRC requires that states make every available effort to
ensure children have access to the highest attainable standards of
healthcare, compulsory primary education with an effort to develop
adequate general and vocational secondary education and access to
adequate food, water and housing. 154 The CRC also prohibits torture,
149. Ratification is the act where a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty.
Glossary of Terms Relating to Treaty Actions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/
page l _ en.xml#ratification (last visited May 10, 2015).
150. "Accession" is the act where a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to
become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same
legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force.
Glossary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/
Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page l _ en.xml#accession (last visited May 10,
2015).
151. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 93.
152. Id.
153. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
NRes/44/25 (Sept. 2, 1990).
154. Id. arts. 3, 24, 27, & 28 .
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cruelty, lengthy imprisonment and capital punishment against children
and seeks to ensure that no child is deprived of life or liberty
"unlawfully or arbitrarily." 155 Further specifying that all "arrest,
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law
and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time." 156

B. International Obligation for the Equal Treatment of Women
In March 1996, Pakistan acceded to the International Convention
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW"), a major treaty advocating the equal treatment of
women. 157 In addition to contradicting the constitution, the FCR' s
treatment of women also violates the CEDAW, which requires Pakistan
"accord to women equality with men before the law." 158 CEDAW goes
so far as to require states parties take the appropriate measures
[T]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women. 159

Under CEDAW Pakistan is obligated to rectify the unequal
treatment women in the tribal areas face as a result of tribal culture, the
Jirgas and the Taliban.
For women in general, CEDAW requires state parties to give
women, in equality with men, the right to vote and to be elected in all
publicly elected bodies and also to participate in the formulation of
govemment. 16 CEDAW also has specific provisions when dealing with
the plight of rural women that can be applied to the FATA. 161 It
requires states parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure rural
women the right to participate in development planning, to have access
to healthcare (including family planning), to be able to attain formal and

°

155. Id. art. 37, para. b.
156. Id.
157. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
158. Id. art. 15(1).
159. Id. art. 5(a).
160. Id. art. 7.
161. Id. art. 14.
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informal education, to participate in their communities and to have
adequate housing, electricity, water and transportation. 162
C. International Obligation to Provide Humane Living Conditions

On April 17, 2008 Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 163 The ICESCR
requires state parties to recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living, which includes adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 164 The
ICESCR also requires that the "development of a system of schools at
all levels shall be actively pursued" and that all people have access to
the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health. 165 The
ICESCR also deals with the equal treatment of all individuals regardless
of race, color, sex or other affiliation and with labor rights. 166
On June 23, 2010 Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the UN Convention against
Torture ("UNCAT"), two of the most notable international agreements
dealing with equality and human rights. 167 Many of the rights and
prohibitions expressed in these two treaties are also represented in the
ICESCR, CEDA W and the CRC, as well as a host of other international
agreements and customary international law. The ICCPR and UNCAT,
as two of the more influential human rights agreements, further
reinforce Pakistan's awareness of the standards it should be applying to
all of its citizenry. They also further cement Pakistan's international
legal obligation to abide by human rights guidelines and reform the
structure of the FAT A to meet them.
The ICCPR deals with individuals' civil and political rights,
addressing the issues of freedom of speech, religion, assembly, voting
rights and due process concerns. 168 Specifically the ICCPR provides for
those whose rights have been violated to be able to seek effective
remedy and that those who claim such remedy "have [their] right[ s]
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative

162. CEDAW, supra note 141, art. 14.
163. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Apr. 17, 2008,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
164. Id. art. 11.
165. Id. arts. 12-13.
166. Id. arts. 2, 8.
167. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 23, 2010, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
168. See id.
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authorities . . . and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy"
where they do not already exist. 169 The UN CAT seeks to prevent the
state use of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment.
The UNCAT defines torture as
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. 170

By June 2011, Pakistan had withdrawn most of its reservations to the
ICCPR and the UNCAT. 171
In the last few years, since Pakistan has shifted its focus from
large-scale military operations to search and intelligence gathering
initiatives, the military has arrested and detained thousands of people.
Human rights groups have expressed concern over the treatment of
these detainees since reports of mistreatment and torture have come to
light. 172 Torture and cruel and inhumane treatment are prohibited by
multiple international agreements, including the ICCPR, the Geneva
Conventions, customary international law, and the UNCAT. 173

169. /d.art.2.
170. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishent, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
171. Pakistan Decides to Withdraw Most of Reservations on ICCPR, UNCA T, NATION
(June 23, 2011), available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-dailyenglish-online/national/23-Jun-2011/Pakistan-decides-to-withdraw-most-of-reservations-onICCPR-UNCAT (last visited May 10, 2015). With respect to the ICCPR, Pakistan still has
reservations regarding Article 3 and Article 25, which deal with gender equality and voting
rights respectively, making these articles subject to the provisions in Pakistan's constitution.
ICCPR, supra note 167 (Pakistan should withdraw its remaining reservations so that the
ICCPR and UNCAT are more effective).
172. Amnesty International has documented the situation of detainees who are kept
malnourished and received daily beatings, causing them to suffer major bodily injury and
disfigurement. The military has also been accused of resorting to torture in the detention
facilities as a method of interrogation. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 19.
173. Torture is a crime under international law and information obtained through
torture or inhumane treatment should not be admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings.
Id. at 21; JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES (Cambridge University Press,
2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-intemationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015).
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For example, article 6 of the ICCPR provides that "[e]very human
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law
and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life," yet Pakistan
continues to detain individuals without cause, detention that often
eventually leads to their uninvestigated deaths. 174 Article 7 of the
ICCPR provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," a general assertion that
is supported more extensively by the UNCAT. 175 Pakistan has agreed to
these provisions and almost all others in these treaties yet continues to
allow its military to exact cruel treatment justified through its own laws,
such as the AACPR.
In part, these human rights violations continue because there is
neither any real consequence levied against the state nor any
opportunity for FATA residents to seek redress. Pakistan's constitution
explicitly excludes the tribal lands from judicial jurisdiction, leaving no
way for the courts to rule on issues of fundamental rights and impunity
within the FATA. Legislation like the AACPR makes redress for
human rights violations especially difficult because it leaves much
military action discretionary and therefore above reproach. 176 This sets
up a series of legal and practical barriers that prevent the people of the
tribal lands from bringing suit against the military in Pakistan's courts.
Despite these obstacles, some cases had made it through, and the
military has even conceded to unlawful action. 177
While these concessions are an important step in developing a
judicial mechanism of redress, they have not translated into justice for
the victims, consequences for the perpetrators or legislative reform. 178
Failing to take steps toward reform or at least investigating these
occurrences of human rights violations puts Pakistan in violation of its
international human rights agreements and its international legal
obligations. Specifically Article 2 Section 3 of the ICCPR each state
that is a party to the agreement has the responsibility to ensure effective
remedies for those whose rights and freedoms are considered violates. 179
The violation of rights and the determination of remedy is to be made

174. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 6 § 1.
175. Id. art. 7.
176. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 9.
177. Cyril Almeida, The Adiala 11, DAWN (Feb.
http://dawn.com/news/6966 l 5/ (last visited May 10, 2015).
178. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 9.
179. I CCPR, supra note 167, art. 2 § 3.
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by "competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities" which
"shall enforce such remedies when granted." 180
In addition to violations of international human rights law,
Pakistan is also in violation of international humanitarian law.
Pakistan's conflict in the FATA is a non-international armed conflict,
and as such, Pakistan is obligated to at least abide by Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. 181 Article 3 provides that prohibited conduct
applies to any person not actively involved in hostilities for any
reason. 182 On November 11, 2009, UN Security Council Resolution
1894 dealt with the protection of civilians in armed conflict and it
emphasized that "states bear the primary responsibility to respect and
ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals
within their territory as provided for by relevant international law." 183
Therefore, it is important to note that while Taliban insurgents are not
adhering to the rules of international law, that does not give Pakistan
valid reason to also violate international law nor does it deprive in any
way the civilian population from the protections of international law to
which they are entitled to from their government and the international
legal framework. 184
VIL PAKISTAN CAN REMEDY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY
GOVERNING THE FATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Human rights organizations like Amnesty International have been
calling on Pakistan to reform or repeal the FCR for years and this is
certainly important. However, another important step towards reform is
earning the people's trust, establishing a consistent message and
following through on it. So far the only thing Pakistan has been
consistent about in the FATA is its neglect of it. When Pakistan has
peace talks with the Taliban, 185 begins reconstruction efforts or
180. Id.
181 . AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at l 01.
182. Id.
183. S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009).
184. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 101.
185. The Pakistani Taliban leadership has demonstrated its ability to negotiate,
conclude, and implement agreements. The decisions of the Pakistani Taliban leadership, for
example when declaring ceasefires, are implemented and enforced by local fighters. A
central hierarchy seems to command and control the escalation and the de-escalation of
military tactics, including serious violations of IHL, such as the use of suicide bombings to
target civilians, attacks on local tribal leaders, and restrictions on the operation of
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implements new government initiatives it needs to make its
commitments clear, it must lay out effective and specific plans with
realistic targets that alleviate the human rights abuses and move the
population forward. This means Pakistan needs a clear strategy for
integrating the FAT A and for the creation of necessary infrastructure
like roads, an education system and adequate health care. Pakistan
should incorporate civilian needs into its military strategy by offering
access and protection to civilian necessities like health care and
education, especially the education of women and girls, which the
Taliban severely limited.
Pakistan must also take care of its weighty Taliban problem. This
is obviously a difficult feat because after decades of insurgency, the
Taliban have proved to be a challenging and well-structured enemy.
The Taliban have been reduced in numbers, and while they are certainly
still an active threat, they are no longer as large a presence in terms of
militant force. Because the Taliban still have an influential presence in
the FATA through maintenance of control of the local governments, the
people of the region, even when they disagree, cannot voice their
dissent for fear of lethal retribution. 186
In order to remedy the egregious human rights situation Pakistan
and the Taliban have created in the FAT A Pakistan must first, enact
legislative reform by integrating the FATA into the parliamentary
system and extending to the FAT A the same rights and amenities
afforded to the rest of the country. Second, Pakistan must implement
these reforms by creating mechanisms for adequate representation,
healthcare, education and equal rights for women. It is important for
Pakistan to realize that any remedy in the region cannot be achieved
through a completely top-down approach. The central government
cannot simply mandate or legislate its way to reform. In a region very
much used to a high level of independence, grass roots initiatives and
local involvement are not just a good idea, but they are absolutely
necessary. Incorporating the tribes and tribal elders into the process
will ensure a much smoother transition. Each area of the FATA is
different, with different needs and traditions. Success is dependent
upon these needs being met and these traditions being accounted for.
Another necessary method of local involvement is incorporating women
into these reforms.

humanitarian aid workers. In short, the Taliban leadership clearly has the ability to respect
IHL and should be held to account for a failure to do so. Id. at 30.
186. Id. at 39.
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A. Previous Attempts at Reforming FATA Governing Mechanisms
While Pakistan's executive leadership has made some halfhearted
attempts over the last two decades to remedy the extreme inequality the
FCR legalizes, these minimal steps have been fruitless because they
have lacked the requisite legislative support. In 1996, Pakistan finally
extended voting rights to adults in the FAT A and also proposed several
reforms to the FCR but they never got very far. Then in 2005,
Musharraf acknowledged the need for reforms and the NWFP (as Kyber
Pakhtunkhwa was then called) governor created the FCR Reform
Committee, but the committee did not accomplish much at all. 187 In
2008, the Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP) promised to repeal the FCR and
incorporate the FAT A into Pakistan's constitutional framework. Also
in 2008, Prime Minister Gilani announced the FCR had been revoked,
but there has been no legislation or judicial ruling to substantiate that
claim or to put it into practical effect.
In August 2009, former President Asif Ali Zardari announced a
reform package for the FAT A, which included placing limitations on
the powers of the PA, right to bail for detainees, protection for women
and children from the collective responsibility provisions, access for
political parties and the setting up of an appeals process. While these
reforms would have limited some of the scope of the FCR, the FCR is
still in place. In 2010, Zardari again promised to reform the FCR but
there has been little movement to actually do so. 188
B. The FATA Must be Integrated into the Central Government

Though Pakistan has made some attempts to reform the way it
governs the FAT A it needs to take a more radical step and totally repeal
the AA CPR and the FCR in order to manage the FATA in accordance
with international human rights standards. The FATA must be brought
under constitutional protection so that the people living within it have
their fundamental rights enforced just like the rest of Pakistan's
citizenry. Under the ICCPR every citizen is supposed to have the right
and opportunity to take part in public affairs directly or through chosen

187. Govt Failed to Implement Recent Reforms in FATA , Amendments in FCR After
Passage of Six Months, ONE PAKJSTAN, available at http://pakistan.onepakistan.com.pk
/news/ city/islamabad/6884 7 -govt-failed-to-imp lement-recent-reforms-in-fata-amendmentsin-fcr-after-passage-of-six-months.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
188. Raja Asghar, Zardari Eyeing History, Wants Bill Passed Soon, DAWN (Apr. 6,
2010), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/529098/zardari-eyeing-history-wants-billpassed-soon (last visited May 10, 2015).
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representatives. 189 Citizens should also be able to vote in periodic
elections through equal suffrage in a way guarantees "the free
expression of the will of the electors." 19° For the most part, Pakistan
abides by these internationally accepted rights, except for when dealing
with the FAT A. Except for the FAT A, all the other provinces in
Pakistan are represented through elected legislators in the bicameral
parliament 191 and the Prime Minister appoints a Chief Minister, as his
representative, to oversee the provincial governments. Though the
FAT A elects representatives to Parliament, no act of Parliament applies
unless the President so directs. 192 As a result, the Political Agent, an
executive that answers only to the President, is the only true official
governing the FATA.
The FAT A must be integrated into the central government as much
as any other province of Pakistan. This means treating it in equality
with other provinces, providing it with representation in Parliament and
with a Chief Minister. It means establishing free and fair elections and
enfranchising the entire adult population of the FAT A. The role of the
PA should be abolished and the constitution should be amended through
removal of Article 24 7 so that jurisdiction and control of the judicial
system and parliament extend there. Doing so will make the central
government and the entire electorate accountable for the issues in the
region.
Until the Political Parties Act of 2002 193 was extended in 2011,
political parties were banned in the FATA. Lack of political parties
made it difficult to have participatory political culture because without
the financial backing of such organizations people could not afford to
contest and win elections. 194 And even if they managed to win an
election without the backing of a political party, that elected individual
would remain insignificant in the parliamentary politics in Islamabad
without the backing of any particular faction and because acts of
parliament have no effect in the FAT A. 195 This is not an effective way

189. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 25(a).
190. Id. art. 25(b ).
191. Pakistan's Parliament is made up of the lower house, known as the National
Assembly, and the upper house, known as the Senate. The National Assembly is comprised
of directly elected representatives from the four provinces. The Senate is comprised of
indirectly elected representatives.
192. PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 54, 59, 247(3).
193. Pakistan Chief Exec. Order 18 (2002), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/
47567a432.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015).
194. Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11.
195. Id.
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to build up the region. Regardless of whom they elect, even if they have
a free and fair choice in the matter, that representative will be further
proof of the incompetency of the federal government's reach. What
would be the point of investing in an election when you know your vote
is meaningless.
Though the Political Parties Act has limited the PA's authority to
some extent, until 2011 the PA enjoyed absolute control over matters of
law and administration. The people of the FATA had no say in local or
national decision making because the PA was not, and still is not, under
any obligation to take them into account. So although the FATA can
technically elect representatives to the National Assembly, voter turnout
in the FATA is low. This is likely because despite the extension of the
Political Parties Act and the limitation of the PA's power, people know
the elections lack any real legitimacy and that there is no effective
representation at the national level. The FCR's allocation of power to
the Political Agent leaves the political power of the FAT A electorate
negligible at best. And since the FCR doesn't allow judicial decisions
or parliamentary legislation to extend to the FATA, these governmental
bodies can go on just ignoring the crises that exists there.
Fully integrating the FAT A means not only repealing
counterproductive legislation like the FCR and AACPR, but also
creating better mechanisms of governing. Knowing that voter turnout is
low because voting has very little tangible effect in the FATA means
Pakistan needs to get rid of those apparatuses that prevent the FAT A
from moving forward. That means establishing a new system of
governmg.
The PA continues to be a repressive force, unaccountable to
anyone but the President. Replacing the PA with a Chief Minister, an
appointee of an elected representative with far more limited power,
would foster better results. Every province in Pakistan has a provincial
assembly, analogous to state legislatures in the U.S., which deals with
provincial matters. 196 Every province except the FATA. The Taliban
corrupted the FATA's Jirga system, but it was hardly a fair system of
governing to begin with. Instead of allowing the tribal lands to continue
with the Jirgas, the government should establish a provincial assembly
in the FATA as well. A more direct line of governing is likely to build
faith among the tribal lands because they are more likely to see the
results that they need, rather than waiting for the federal government to
step in as they have been.

196. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 106.
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C. Women Must be Treated Equally with Men Before the Law
Another change that should be made in FAT A governing is better
treatment of women. While the rest of the constitution enfranchises
women by mandating seats for them in Parliament, it conspicuously
fails to do so for women in the FATA by not allocating seats for
them. 197 Women in the FATA also do not have the right to vote. This
right should be extended in the FAT A since it already exists throughout
the other provinces. The ICCPR talks about universal suffrage 198 and
CEDAW specifies that women should be afforded equality with men
before the law. 199
Another way to better the situation of women in the FAT A would
be to involve them in all reconstruction efforts going forth. It is
imperative that a more inclusive public sphere be created for women.
That means women must be guaranteed fair and equal voting rights as
well as the ability to participate in conflict resolution and
reconstruction. Pakistan must find a way to enfranchise women in a
way that does not force them to break with their tribal traditions. They
will have a voice in the reconstruction of their communities without
being forced to value their traditions against a new governmental order.
The current state of women in the FAT A violates the terms of the
ICCPR and CEDAW and is also contradictory to the majority of the
constitution. Pakistan must remedy this in order to comply with its
international obligations and also to maintain consistency in governing.
D. Perpetrators ofHuman Rights Violations Must be Held Accountable
Pakistan needs to send a clear message that the violence and
inhumane treatment the FAT A has dealt with is completely
unacceptable. It needs to earn the confidence of the tribal people and
eventually their support. That means not only extending rights and
protections to the tribal lands but also holding both state and non-state
actors accountable for their human rights transgressions. So far
Pakistan has failed in its responsibility to protect the people of the
FAT A from Taliban insurgents, as well as misconduct by the armed
forces.
At the hands of the Taliban the FATA has been riddled with
unlawful killing, unlawful detention, torture, ill treatment, deprivation
of equality, inadequate healthcare, no freedom of association, no
197. Id. arts. 54, 59.
198. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 25(b).
199. CEDAW, supra note 157, art. 15.
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freedom of movement and dwindling education for girls and women. 200
They have suffered the destruction of civilian residences, farms and
businesses. 201 All of these serious human rights violations are already
considered criminal offenses under Pakistan's law, but such law has
never been enforced due to neglect and the cover given to the central
government under the FCR.
While the central government and even the military are not
completely responsible202 for the actions of the Taliban, they are
responsible for failing to exact adequate measures to stop these abuses
from happening once they are aware. This can only be done through the
extension of judicial jurisdiction. Since the Pakistan's courts have no
reach in the FAT A, any allegations of mistreatment cannot be brought
before an impartial body and therefore injured parties have no form of
redress and perpetrators are not held accountable. The FAT A does have
its own court system, but the Jirgas or the will of the Political Agent
often circumvents those courts' decisions. To reform this, the FATA
courts should be brought under the national judicial system just as the
other provincial courts are, with their apex being the Supreme Court of
Pakistan.
When Pakistan eventually deals with the Taliban, as it will
inevitably have to do, it must refrain from giving clemency to those who
are unequivocally implicated in those serious abuses of human rights
and breaches of law.
According to customary international
humanitarian law, military commanders and civilian leaders can be held
accountable for the actions of their subordinates, when and if their
subordinates commit war crimes, or if they knew their subordinates
were committing such actions, and they took no necessary measures to
prevent such actions. 203 Taliban leaders can be held accountable for the
abuses they perpetrate and, under this same provision, so can armed
forces personnel.
Remedying the Taliban's transgressions will be only one part of
Pakistan's efforts towards solving the human rights crisis in the FATA.
Pakistan must also hold its own military and political leaders
200. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 100.
201. Id.
202. There are peace talks with the Taliban where the military or state agencies have
condoned, allowed, or supported some of the Taliban's actions against FATA residents. In
those instances, Pakistan is certainly more responsible, and should eventually be held
accountable through investigation and judicial action. Strategic considerations should not
be available as an excuse for neglecting the population or for knowingly allowing insurgents
to commit human rights transgressions.
203. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 173, at Rule 152.
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accountable. First, Pakistan must make sure that all military forces are
aware of the correct standard of conduct that is expected of them under
international law and under the hopefully reformed method of
governing the FAT A. They must then be required to comply with those
obligations and it must be made clear that failure to do so will have
appropriate consequences. Human rights transgressions that have
already been made should be properly and impartially investigated
according to international standards so that those who have committed
illegal actions are brought to justice. The military should be required to
incorporate precautionary measures for civilians in their strategy, and
they should absolutely be prohibited from any sort of collective
punishment, the sort that is allowed under the current FCR.
Some of Pakistan's most egregious human rights violations revolve
around arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances. 204 Not only is
this a human rights violation, but it also creates a climate of fear in the
FATA that is counterproductive to any reconstructive efforts. Pakistan
should investigate and reveal any information it has about the fate and
location of those who have been subjected to enforced disappearances.
Pakistan should also sign and ratify the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ("CED").
Ratification of CED would signal that Pakistan is committed to ending
this practice, which is a grave violation of human rights.
Those criminal and insurgent suspects who can be transferred out
of military custody and into civilian detention centers should be
transferred and then should be provided with all the safeguards
available to them under the constitution, 205 domestic and international
law. Those detainees should then be afforded fair trials in front of
competent and impartial courts. Pakistan may have an easier time of all
this if it builds up the law enforcement mechanism of the tribal areas.
Rather than having a constant military presence, a trained law
enforcement agency would be able to alleviate the military presence in
the region while still being a safeguard against insurgents and protecting
civilians.

CONCLUSION
The problems Pakistan faces are certainly not simple ones. Any
remedy that Pakistan implements, and there are many that it must, will

204.
205.

AMNESTY INT'L,

supra note 29, at 49.
art. 10.

PAKISTAN CONST.
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take years to show practical improvement. But the longer Pakistan
waits, the worse the situation in the FAT A gets. More people will lose
their lives, their homes and their livelihoods. Pakistan can start by
taking legislative measures to equalize the FAT A and its residents with
the rest of the country. Pakistan must then begin holding those who
have committed human rights abuses accountable for their actions and
showing the FATA residents that they are not in fact second-class
citizens. Pakistan must then begin to rebuild the FAT A through greater
infrastructure; better education, especially for women and girls; access
to health care and training for law enforcement to maintain security.
Pakistan has to create incentives for the FATA to support it because as
of right now they risk losing their lives by expressing dissent from the
Taliban and any sort of government effort towards redress does not
outweigh this risk.
Pakistan has made many mistakes in dealing with the FAT A.
Between decades of neglect for the tribal lands and the military' s
gutting of the region for "national security" purposes, the inadequate
judicial systems, the weak government structure and the total lack of
development, the situation has only worsened. These issues have to be
remedied not only because they are major transgressions against human
rights, but also because they exacerbate a problem that poses a
substantial threat to Pakistan's national security and internal stability. It
is time for Pakistan to meet its human rights responsibilities to its
people, both for morality and for practical necessity.
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